Does branch religiosity influence bank risk taking? by Chircop, Justin et al.






Lancaster University Management School  
 
Fabrizi Michele 











University of Padova 
Department of Economics and Management 
Via del Santo, 33 
35123 Padova, Italy 
antonio.parbonetti@unipd.it 





We acknowledge helpful comments and suggestions on previous versions of this paper from the 
editor Andrew Stark, an anonymous reviewer, Andreas Charitou, Luo He, Michel Magnan, Patricia 
O’Brien and Stephen Penman. 




Abstract. Using branch-level data on public and private U.S. banking institutions we investigate the 
importance of branch religiosity in shaping bank risk-taking behavior. Our results show robust 
evidence that branch religiosity is negatively related to bank risk-taking. This effect persists after 
controlling for several bank-level and county-level variables that might correlate with religiosity. 
Moreover, this result is robust to controlling for headquarter religiosity, suggesting that the effect of 
branch religiosity is additive and not washed out by headquarter religiosity. Overall, our findings 
document that headquarter religiosity does not capture the full effect of religiosity on bank 
behavior, as claimed by previous research, but that the religiosity of the geographic area in which 
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Does branch religiosity influence bank risk taking? 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper tests the importance of branch religiosity in shaping bank risk-taking. A rich 
literature across several disciplines provides strong and robust evidence of a strong relation 
between headquarter religiosity and risk-taking in non-financial (McGuire et al., 2012; Kumar et 
al., 2011; Dyreng et al., 2010; Hilary and Hui, 2009; Grullon et al., 2009) and financial firms 
(Adhikari and Agrawal, 2016; Kanagaretnam et al., 2015; 2013).  
A common research design choice of prior literature is its exclusive focus on the 
religiosity of the geographical area of the corporate headquarters. In most cases such a choice is 
implicitly motivated by the location of important firm stakeholders (Hilary and Hui, 2009). 
Specifically, given that the corporate headquarters is the venue in which firm strategic decisions 
are made, it is reasonable to assume that firm senior employees reside in the vicinity of the 
corporate headquarters. Similarly, given that the corporate headquarters is the center of 
information exchange between the firm and investors, and the documented investor “home bias” 
(Coval and Moskowitz, 1999), it is also reasonable to assume that firm shareholders would reside 
in the vicinity of corporate headquarters. Given this, prior literature finds that headquarter 
religiosity is inversely related to bank risk taking (Adhikari and Agrawal, 2016). 
In solely focusing on headquarter religiosity, prior literature assumes that all firm 
decisions are made at the corporate headquarters and that thus only these decisions, which are 
influenced by the religiosity of the headquarter geographical location, give rise to bank risk. 
However, this might not be the case for banks, which tend to have geographically dispersed 
operations with decentralized decision making. There are three reasons why we expect branch 
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level operations to influence bank risk-taking. First, bank customers’ religiosity is likely to 
influence bank risk-taking. Studies in economic literature find that religious people are risk-
averse (Miller, 2000; Diaz, 2000; Miller and Hoffman, 1995) and thus, banks with more religious 
customers are likely to have less risky borrowers. Second, building on organizational legitimacy 
theory, we argue that when banks operate in very religious, and thus risk averse, geographic 
areas the level of risk of each branch has to be adjusted to the expectations of stakeholders to 
avoid a misalignment between the two value systems. Finally, religious norms of the local 
population in which the firm operates will influence branch employees irrespective of whether 
they are themselves religious (Dyreng et al., 2012). This prediction is ultimately grounded in 
social norm theory, which posits that individuals will act in ways that conform to the behavioral 
norms of the groups with which they associate. Moreover, such influence is amplified by the 
need of the bank to maintain organizational legitimacy.  
We conjecture that the effect of branch religiosity on bank risk-taking is above and 
beyond the previously documented effect of headquarters’ religiosity on bank risk taking. 
Specifically, if the geographic area in which the company operates influences bank risk-taking 
and if we view religious individuals as more risk averse (similar to Miller, 2000; Diaz, 2000; and 
Miller and Hoffman, 1995) then we should expect banks operating in highly religious areas to 
take on lower risk. However, based on previous research whether the geographical location of 
bank branches influences bank risk taking is ultimately an empirical question. 
To test whether branch religiosity influences risk taking, we focus our study on each 
branch of 1,758 public and private U.S. banking institutions over the period 2000-2010. We 
measure branch religiosity using data collected from the American Religion Data Archive 
(ARDA) and proxy for bank risk using the Z-score, the amount of charge offs, the amount of 
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non-performing loans and the probability of bank failure over the sample period. Further, in an 
attempt to minimize measurement error included in these proxies, we use principal component 
analysis to compute a composite measure of bank risk. In line with our expectations and the 
conjecture that branch religiosity influences the bank’s risk profile, we find a significant negative 
relation between our measure of branch religiosity and bank risk taking. Importantly, our results 
are robust to controlling for headquarter religiosity, thus suggesting that the effect of branch 
religiosity is additive and not washed out by the effect of headquarter religiosity.  
In further analyses, we take advantage of the large number of bank mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) over the sample period to tease out the branch versus headquarter effect. 
Specifically, we find that branch religiosity of the target firm is significantly negatively related to 
the change in bank risk after the M&A deal. This result provides further evidence that branch 
religiosity plays a role in shaping the overall bank’s risk-taking. We also test whether the 
incidence of Protestants, a religious denomination which prior literature has found to be 
particularly risk averse (Kumar et al., 2011), influences the relation between branch religiosity 
and bank risk taking. In line with our expectations, we find that banks with branches located in 
high Protestant areas are less risky. Finally, although our results are not driven by the 2007-2008 
crises, the relation between religiosity and risk becomes stronger after the crisis period, as people 
are more aware of potential bank risk taking behavior and thus exert increased oversight on 
banks.  
Our study contributes to extant prior literature in the following ways. First, to our 
knowledge, this is the first empirical study that examines the role of branch religiosity on bank 
risk-taking behavior. By showing that the geographic location in which bank operations are 
carried out influences the overall bank risk-taking, we extend prior studies, which document a 
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significant association between headquarter religiosity and risk-taking (Hilary and Hui, 2009; 
Adhikari and Agrawal, 2016). This is the main contribution of the paper. Second, this study 
contributes to the literature that examines the influence of religion on risk-taking. In this regard, 
we complement prior studies, which analyze the influence of religiosity on economic decisions 
in different industries (Hilary and Hui, 2009; Dyreng et al., 2010; Grullon et al., 2010; McGuire 
et al., 2011). Similar to Adhikari and Agrawal (2016), we focus on the banking industry. This 
allows us to better control for the peculiarities of the industry, which may influence the 
relationship between religiosity and risk-taking. Moreover, focusing our analysis on banks 
allows us to test our hypothesis in a challenging research setting. Indeed, banks represent one of 
the most regulated industries in the US and this may possibly water down the influence of 
religion on firm decision-making.  
 The structure of this study is as follows. In the next section, we provide an overview of 
extant prior literature and develop a testable hypothesis. Section 3 sets out details about the 
sample used in the study and provides an overview of the research design. The results of the 
main analysis and robustness tests are discussed in Section 4, while in Section 5 we provide 
information about additional analyses undertaken. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
2.1 The influence of religiosity 
Religiousness is an important social mechanism, which influences the behavior of 
individuals both in terms of economic decisions as well as in terms of social interactions 
(Kennedy and Lawton, 1998; North, 1991; Stulz and Williamson, 2003; Boone et al., 2012). 
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Economic literature has established a link between religiosity and risk aversion (Iannaccone, 
1998; Lehrer, 2004; Dohmen et al, 2011; Liu, 2010; Miller and Hoffmann, 1995; Noussair, 
2013), where more anxious individuals are more likely to seek comfort and support in religion 
(Malinowski, 1925; Gasper and Clore, 1998; Miller and Hoffman, 1995). Such an association 
has been observed in numerous academic studies, in fields ranging from psychology to 
management. Miller and Hoffmann (1995) use survey data of high school seniors and find a 
negative association between religiosity and self-reported attitudes toward risk and danger. 
Osoba (2003) finds that risk-averse individuals attend church more often than risk-seeking 
individuals while Diaz (2000) finds that religious people living in Las Vegas gamble less.  
Legitimacy theory suggests that there is a need for firms to establish ‘congruence 
between the social values associated with or implied by [organizational] activities and the norms 
of acceptable behavior in the larger social system of which they are a part’ (Downling and 
Pfeffer 1975, p. 122). Instances where firms’ actions are in conflict with stakeholder social 
norms are likely to result in a legitimacy gap, which may ultimately lead to a legitimacy crisis. If 
the firm does not adequately address such a crisis, stakeholders may withhold resources from the 
firm, thus hampering its operations.  
This argument is reinforced by the social norm theory. This theory posits that the 
religious norms of the local population in which the organization is established will influence 
management irrespective of whether management is itself religious, since the local population is 
an important element of the environment in which managers live and operate (Kohlberg, 1984; 
Sunstein, 1996, Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004 and McGuire et al., 2011). Moreover, such 





2.2 Religiosity and firm behavior 
Recent studies empirically show that firms operating in different social environments 
exhibit different behaviors. This literature links religious adherence to lower risk taking 
(Adhikari and Aggrawal, 2016; Li et al., 2013; Hilary and Hui, 2009), lower incidences of 
financial reporting irregularities and lower earnings management (Kanagaretnam et al., 2015; 
Lievenbruck and Schmid, 2014; McGuire et al., 2011: Dyreng et al., 2012). However, to our 
knowledge all prior studies only consider the religiosity of the geographical location of the 
corporate headquarters neglecting the religiosity of the locations of other firm operating units. 
The corporate headquarters of a firm is the venue in which the firm strategic decisions are 
taken, the work place of the most senior firm employees and the center of information exchange 
between the firm and investors (Davis and Henderson, 2008). Moreover, given the documented 
investor “home bias” where investors seek to hold and trade stocks of firms headquartered in 
nearby locations to take advantage of easier access to information about the company (Coval and 
Moskowitz, 1999; Grinblatt and Meloharju, 2001; Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2005), the 
geographic location of the headquarters is also likely the location of most of the firm investors. 
Based on the previously discussed legitimacy and social norm theories, it is likely that the 
concentration of senior firm employees and investors, two important firm stakeholders, around 
the geographical location of the corporate headquarters results in headquarter religiosity 
subsuming any influence branch religiosity might have on firm decision making. 
The above discussion is based on the premise that all firm decisions are generated at the 
corporate headquarters and are thus solely influenced by religiosity in the geographical location 
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of the headquarters. However, this might not be the case for some firms. In fact, many firms are 
geographically dispersed with decision making units operating in different geographical areas. 
McGuire et al. (2011) tests whether the negative association between headquarter religiosity and 
the risk of financial irregularities stands for a sample of geographically dispersed firms and find 
mixed results. Specifically, they conclude that “geographic dispersion influences the association 
between the religious social norms [of the geographical location of the headquarters] and 
financial reporting” (p.666). 
  
2.3 Hypothesis development 
Banks are some of the most geographically dispersed firms, comprised of a network of 
semiautonomous bank branches. In this regard we investigate the importance of branch 
religiosity in influencing bank risk appetite. Specifically, we posit that branch religiosity affects 
bank risk in three distinct ways. First, economic literature shows that religious people are risk-
averse and thus, banks with branches in more religious areas are likely to have more religious – 
thus less risky - borrowers. Second, to minimize the risk of a legitimacy crisis, in their decision-
making process, managers will seek to conform to the social norms of the particular geographical 
region in which they operate. In other words, religious customers will not only influence bank 
risk taking in that these customers are more risk averse, but the bank will also adapt its social 
values so as to establish congruence between its values and those of its customers thus reducing 
the risk of a legitimacy crisis. Finally, in line with the social norm theory, the religious norms of 
the local population in which the firm operates will influence branch employees and managers 
irrespective of whether they are themselves religious. We refer to the first motive as the demand 
effect and the latter two effects as the supply effect of branch religiosity on bank risk taking. 
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Summing up, if all firm decisions are generated at the corporate headquarter, we should 
expect that the location of the headquarters fully explains the effect of religiosity on risk taking 
behaviors. In contrast, if the demand and supply effects of branch religiosity discussed above 
play a role in bank risk taking, based on the economic, legitimacy and the social norm theories, 
the geographical location of bank branches should affect bank risk taking. Therefore, it is an 
empirical question as to whether the relation between headquarter religiosity and bank behavior 
documented in prior literature (Kanagaretnam et al., 2015) captures the full effect of religiosity 
on bank risk taking. Consequently, we posit the following hypothesis in the null form: 
 
H1: Bank branch religiosity is not associated with bank risk taking 
 
3. Data and Research Design 
 
3.1 Data 
We obtain data on the number and location of bank branches from the SNL Financial 
Institutions database and accounting variables are computed using data from the FR-9YC reports 
from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. 
We begin our sample period in 2000 because branch-level data on SNL are only available 
as from 1998 and thus the first American Religion Data Archive (ARDA) survey we can use is 
the one in 2000. We end our sample period in 2010, as this is the last year for which data on 
religion is available on ARDA. The drop in the number of observations in 2006 is due to the 
increase by the Federal Reserve in the asset-size threshold for filing the Consolidated Financial 
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Statements (FR-9YC)1 from $150 million to $500 million. Our sample period covers the 2007-08 
financial crisis, which we examine separately as a quasi-exogenous shock to improve our 
identification strategy.  
 
3.2 Variable Measurement 
3.2.1 Measure for Branch Religiosity 
  Our data on religiosity come from ARDA. 2  These county-level religion data are 
compiled every ten years, and we obtain our data from the 2000 and 2010 decennial surveys. For 
years in which a survey is not available, we follow previous studies (Adhikari and Agrawal, 
2016; Dyreng et al., 2012; Hilary and Hui, 2009; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000) and linearly 
interpolate the data to obtain the values for religiosity in the missing years. The linear 
interpolation increases the power of our tests, but as discussed in the following sections, the 
results also hold when we do not linearly interpolate the religiosity measure. To proxy for banks’ 
branch religiosity (Branch Religiosity) we employ a two-step procedure. First, using ARDA data, 
for each county in which the bank has branches we compute the proportion of countywide 
population that claims affiliation with an organized religion. Specifically, we compute county 
religiosity as the number of adherents per 1,000 county habitants. Subsequently, we collapse the 
county-level religiosity measure into a bank-level religiosity metric, by weighting each county-
level measure by the amount of deposits the bank has in the county. As Branch Religiosity is 
highly skewed, we use its logarithmic transformation in the analysis. 
 
                                                        
1 In Section 4, we perform robustness tests to rule out the possibility that the drop in sample size could have an 
effect on our results. 
2 We acknowledge the existence of self-selection bias in ARDA data because congregations self-select to participate 
in the study. Nonetheless, the alternative source of data on religiosity – the Gallup survey – suffers from the same 
self-selection bias, which is inherent in the collected responses. 
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3.2.2 Measures for Bank Risk Taking 
We measure bank risk taking using risk proxies that have been extensively used in 
previous literature (e.g. Laeven and Levine, 2009; Kanagaretnam et al. 2013).3 The first proxy 
for bank risk-taking is the Z-score, a measure of bank stability that indicates the distance from 
insolvency. Specifically, Z-score is computed as (ROA+CAR)/σ(ROA), where ROA is earnings 
before taxes and loan loss provisions divided by assets, CAR is capital-asset ratio, and σ(ROA), 
is the standard deviation of ROA over the sample period. The Z-score is inversely related to the 
probability of a bank’s insolvency. A bank becomes insolvent when its asset value drops below 
its debt and the Z-score shows the number of standard deviations that a bank’s return on asset 
has to fall below its expected value to deplete equity and make the bank insolvent. Thus, a higher 
Z-score indicates that the bank is more solvent. Because the Z-score is highly skewed we use its 
logarithmic transformation and multiply it by negative 1, so that a higher value indicates higher 
risk (LnZscore).  
The second proxy for bank risk-taking is loan charge-offs (CO), which represents the 
amount of loans written-off as uncollectible in a year. Charge-offs represents recognition in the 
bank’s financial statements that loan payments will not be collected. Since there might be some 
discretion in recognizing charge-offs (Liu and Ryan, 2006), we use an additional proxy for credit 
losses: non-performing loans (NPL). NPLs are loans that have been modified in a troubled debt 
restructuring, are past due, or for which interest revenue is not currently being recorded. NPLs 
essentially represent economic losses and forgone interest revenue resulting from the poor credit 
quality of the borrower. Both CO and NPL are scaled by gross loans. Finally, we include as the 
ultimate measure of risk, an indicator variable which equals one if the bank failed during the 
                                                        
3 We do not use market-based proxies for banks’ riskiness because part of our sample consists of non-listed banks.  
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sample period and zero otherwise (Failure). 
 
3.4 Research Design 
To assess the effect of branch religiosity on bank risk taking we estimate the following 
regression model: 
 
Risk = β0 + β1 Branch Religiosity + β2 Headquarter Religiosity + Σβj Controls + ε   (1) 
 
where the dependent variable, Risk, stands for one of the four bank risk-taking proxies discussed 
above, and Branch Religiosity is our variable of interest. Previous research suggests a link 
between firms’ headquarter religiosity and firm behavior (e.g. Adhikari and Agrawal, 2016; 
Dyreng et al., 2012; Kanagaretnam et al., 2013; McGuire et al. 2011; Hilary and Hui 2009), 
therefore we include Headquarter Religiosity, computed as the logarithmic transformation of the 
number of adherents per 1,000 population of the county where the bank headquarters is located. 
Controls denote the vector of variables controlling for bank and county characteristics that are 
likely to influence bank risk-taking behavior (see Ellul and Yeramilli, 2013). To control for the 
effect systematic differences in the scope of banks’ operations might have on bank risk taking we 
use the following two variables: Non Interest which proxies for the intensity of fee-based 
activities and is computed as the ratio of noninterest income to net operating income4 and the 
ratio of tier 1 to risk-weighted assets (Tier 1) which controls for the capital strength of the bank. 
Consistent with prior literature, we control for differences in bank size using the logarithm of 
total assets (LnAssets). To control for growth opportunities, we include in our model the 
variables Asset Growth and Revenue Growth, which are computed as the percentage annual 
                                                        
4 We define net operating income as noninterest income plus interest income minus interest expense. 
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change in total assets and interest revenue, respectively. We also control for profitability using 
ROA (earnings before taxes over total assets) and for volatility using the standard deviation of 
ROA (STD ROA) over the sample period. To control for the type of lending activity we include: 
Commercial, Individual, Real Estate and Depository Institutions which are the ratio of 
commercial, individual, real estate and depository institutions loans to total loans respectively. 
To control for possible moral hazard problems that can make a bank prone to risk taking, we 
include as a control variable Too Big, which is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the bank accounts for more than 10% of the yearly total deposits of the sampled banks and zero 
otherwise. Finally, to control for the relative importance of the bank in our sample we include 
Bank Market Share computed as the market share of the bank total sample deposits.  
In addition to our bank-level control variables, we include several U.S. Census Bureau 
county-level demographic variables that prior research suggests are determinants of religiosity 
(Iannaccone, 1998; Hilary and Hui, 2009). By including these variables in the regression model 
we make sure that Branch Religiosity captures the effect of religiosity per se, as opposed to 
simply the effect of other correlated county-level demographic characteristics. Specifically, 
Diversity is the percentage of racial minorities in a specific county; Education is educational 
attainment defined as the percentage of people (25 years and over) having a bachelor’s, graduate 
or professional degree; Economics is the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s state-level 
coincident index of economic conditions. We control for the number of religious denominations 
in a county using the variable Congregations that is computed in the same way as Branch 
Religiosity but considering the number of congregations instead of the number of adherents. 
Republicans is the percentage of the adult population who is affiliated with the Republican Party. 
For consistency with the other variables included in the model, we weight the county-level 
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measures by the amount of deposits in each county. We include year fixed effect to control for 
any general time trend effects and cluster standard errors by both bank and year. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1% in both tails to reduce the influence of outliers. Appendix A 
defines all the variables used in our analyses. 
To overcome any concern that the high correlation between Branch Religiosity and 
Headquarter Religiosity may bias our results, we drop from our sample those observations for 
which Branch Religiosity and Headquarter Religiosity are in the same decile.5 Table 1 describes 
the distribution of observations over the sample period. We use 7,831 firm-year observations for 




4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis. For the 
average bank in our sample, CO and NPL represent 0.5% and 2.3% of gross loans, respectively. 
Moreover, revenue and asset growth is around 3.5% and 9.2%, respectively. Most of the loans 
are classified in the Real Estate category, while a non-trivial percentage of loans are Commercial 
loans, 16.4%. 
In Table 3 we report evidence at univariate level on the effect of branch religiosity on 
bank risk taking. We group observations into quartiles according to the Branch Religiosity’s 
value and tabulate the values of the bank risk proxies for the top and bottom quartile. The mean 
                                                        
5 After removing these observations, the correlation between branch religiosity and headquarter religiosity is 35%. 
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values of Z-score, charge-off, non-performing loans and Failure for the top quartile (bottom 
quartile) are -3.902 (-3.789), 0.004 (0.005), 0.021 (0.022) and 0.004 (0.024), respectively. These 
results indicate that banks with branches in more religious areas (Top 25%) appear to take fewer 
risks than banks with branches located in less religious areas (Low 25%). Overall, tests of 
differences in mean and median reported in the table show that results are statistically 
significant. 
 
<<TABLE 2 AND TABLE 3>> 
 
4.2 Main Results 
We regress each of the four bank’s risk taking measures on branch religiosity, 
headquarter religiosity, bank-level and county-level control variables, and report the results in 
Table 4. We expect banks to take less risk as branch religiosity increases. When we use LnZscore 
as dependent variable we do not control for ROA and STD ROA as these variables are included in 
the computation of the Z-Score. In addition, given that CO and NPL are sticky over time, when 
we use these two measures as dependent variables we also control for their lagged values. 
Moreover, given that in literature there is no consensus on the appropriate proxy for risk, and the 
four proxies capture different aspects of risk taking behavior, we use principal component 
analysis to compute a composite measure of risk (Overall Risk). This analysis alleviates concerns 
about random measurement error of a single risk metric and allows for better identification of 
bank risk-taking. We apply a principal component analysis to the four bank-risk taking proxies 
and retain the first factor, which has an eigenvalue of 1.85 and accounts for about 47 percent of 
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the total variance of the original variables. For consistency, when we use Overall Risk as 
dependent variable, we include only controls that are common to all the models.  
For each of the reported specifications, we consistently find that, controlling for the effect 
of headquarter religiosity, higher branch religiosity translates into lower levels of bank risk 
taking. Indeed, consistent with our prediction the coefficients on Branch Religiosity are negative 
and statistically significant, suggesting that branch-level religiosity plays a role in influencing the 
bank’s risk taking behavior.  
Results reported in column 5 of Table 4 - which shows the results for Overall Risk – 
suggests that, consistent with previous research, headquarter religiosity is negatively and 
significantly associated with bank risk taking (Adhikari and Agrawal, 2016; McGuire et al. 2011; 
Hilary and Hui 2009).6 More importantly, we find that branch religiosity exhibits a negative and 
significant relation with risk taking. This result implies that the effect of branch religiosity on 
risk is additive and not washed out by the effect of the headquarters. Results documented are 
both statistically and economically significant. Moving from the first to the second quartile of the 
branch religiosity distribution reduces Overall Risk by 0.022 which corresponds to 8.7% of the 







                                                        
6 To ensure the low number of clusters in our analysis does not understate the standard errors we run specifications 
in which we separately include year and bank clusters. The results for these specifications are shown in columns 6 
and 7 of Table 4 respectively. 
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4.3 Further analyses 
 4.3.1 M&A Transactions 
 To better tease out the branch versus headquarter effects we take advantage of the large 
number of bank mergers and acquisitions (M&A) over our sample period.7 Specifically, we 
claim that if our intuition holds true and branch religiosity plays a role in shaping bank’s risk-
taking, we should observe that, the change in risk after the deal is a function of the branch 
religiosity of the target bank. In other words, we expect that the religiosity of the areas in which 
the branches of the target bank are located affects the change in risk taking of the acquirer bank 
in the post-deal period. 
To carry out this test, we retrieve all bank M&A deals over our sample period from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago database, and keep the M&A deals that satisfy the following 
conditions: 1) there are data to compute the total religiosity of the acquirer (both headquarter and 
branches); 2) there are data to compute the branch religiosity of the target; 3) there is only one 
M&A deal during the sample period analyzed, and 4) there are data to compute our measures of 
risk and all control variables. These selection criteria lead to a sample of 125 unique M&A deals. 
We consider the change in risk of the acquirer as a function of the difference between the 
acquirer’s total religiosity and the target’s branch religiosity and we propose the following 
model: 
 
Change Risk = β0 + β1 Diff_Religiosity + Σβj Controls + ε           (2) 
 
In the above specification, Change Risk is actual change in Overall Risk for the acquirer bank 
between the three years after the deal and the three years before the deal. Diff_Religiosity is the 
                                                        
7 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
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difference between the target’s branch religiosity and the acquirer’s total religiosity (defined as 
the sum of Branch Religiosity and Headquarter Religiosity of the acquirer bank) measured one 
year before the M&A deal. Thus, the higher the target’s branch religiosity compared to the 
acquirer’s total religiosity, the higher the value of Diff_Religiosity. If branch religiosity is driving 
our results, we expect a negative and significant relation between the change in the risk of the 
acquirer bank and the branch religiosity of the target bank in the post M&A period. 
Results for Eq. 2 are reported in Table 5. Our findings show that the branch religiosity of 
the target bank maps into the risk taking of the acquirer. Specifically, estimates reported in 
Column (1) suggest that moving from the first to the second quartile of Diff_Religiosity reduces 
Change Risk by 22.5%. As an additional analysis in Column (2) of Table 5, we report an 
alternative specification in which we include both the target’s branch religiosity (Branch 
Religiosity Target) and the acquirer’s total religiosity (Total Religiosity Acquirer). In this way 
the coefficient on Branch Religiosity Target captures the effect of target’s branch religiosity 
while controlling for the effect of the acquirer’s total religiosity. In line with previous results, 
the coefficient on Branch Religiosity Target is negative and significant, thus corroborating 





While so far results are consistent with religiosity having an effect on bank risk taking, to 
assess this further, we exploit the fact that in our data we can decompose overall religious 
adherence by denomination. By decomposing religious adherence by denomination we can more 
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precisely investigate the role of religiosity on bank risk-taking. A large literature suggests 
Protestants are the most risk adverse denomination (Dyreng et al., 2012; Shu et al., 2012; Hilary 
and Hui, 2009; Benjamin et al., 2010; and Kumar et al., 2011). If risk aversion is what is driving 
the results, we expect the effect to be stronger the greater the bank exposure to the Protestant 
denomination. 
In Table 6 we re-estimate Eq.1, but split the sample according to the banks’ exposure to 
the Protestant denomination. Specifically, we follow previous studies (Hilary and Hui, 2009; 
Dyreng et al., 2012) and measure Protestant adherents as the ratio of Protestants divided by the 
county population. Subsequently, we create a bank level measure of exposure to the Protestant 
denomination by weighing the value of Protestant adherents in each county by county bank 
branch deposits. Finally, we split the sample between high and low bank exposure to Protestant 
denomination using the sample median. If risk aversion is important, we should observe larger 
negative coefficients for those banks with a higher exposure to Protestants. In line with our 
expectations, Table 6 shows that the magnitude of the estimated coefficient for Branch 
Religiosity for banks with higher exposure to Protestants is significantly larger (at the 1% level) 
than the corresponding coefficient for the low Protestant sample. Specifically, for banks with a 
high percentage of Protestants, moving from the first to the second quartile of Branch Religiosity 
reduces Overall Risk by 0.030 which corresponds to the 13.2% of the average value of Overall 
Risk in our sample. This effect is only 4% for banks with low exposure to Protestants. 
 





 4.3.3 Financial Crisis 
Our research framework posits that branch level religiosity affects the bank’s risk profile 
(also) because religious stakeholders are risk averse, hence banks have to consider these 
preferences in their decision making process (supply effect). Therefore, as concerns on banks’ 
risk taking activities increase, the social pressure exerted by stakeholders on banks should 
increase as well and we should observe that the negative impact of branch religiosity on bank 
risk becomes stronger. We use the recent financial crisis as a natural experiment to test this 
conjecture. The cause of the 2008-2009 economic downturn was widely attributed, by media 
commentators and the general public, to the incompetence and greed of senior executives of 
major banking corporations (Hargie et al., 2010). The senior bankers involved in the collapse of 
major banks were pilloried in the media and portrayed as being both avaricious and incompetent 
figures, who earned vast salaries and bonuses while taking enormous foolhardy financial risks, at 
no personal cost (Hargie et al., 2010). As a consequence, as the financial crisis unfolded, 
stakeholders became more aware of bank risk taking and, thus, according to legitimacy theory 
the influence of branch religiosity on bank risk taking should stronger.  
  To test this conjecture, we define an indicator variable, Crisis, that takes the value of 1 
for years after 2007, and zero otherwise. We interact this indicator variable with Branch 
Religiosity and report results in Table 7. The coefficient on Branch Religiosity is negative and 
significant, consistent with our main results. The interaction term is negative and significant, 
suggesting that the financial crisis had an incremental influence on the relationship between 
branch religiosity and bank risk taking. This finding is consistent with the conjecture that in the 
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aftermath of the financial crisis, stakeholders are more aware of the potential bank risk taking 




4.4 Robustness checks for the main results 
4.4.1 Lead Risk Metrics  
In the previous analyses, we investigate a contemporaneous relation between branch 
religiosity and bank risk. Nonetheless, risk measured at time (t) could be the result of actions 
undertaken a few years earlier. In other words, it could be argued that current religiosity affects 
bank’s future risk taking activity, besides current risk taking behaviors. To test this conjecture, 
we estimate our main model by measuring risk one, two, and three years ahead, respectively and 
report results in Table 8. For each of the reported specifications, we find negative and significant 
coefficients on Branch Religiosity corroborating the results in our main analyses.  
 
<<TABLE 8 >> 
 
4.4.2 Sample Size 
In November 2005 the Federal Reserve modified the requirement for filing the FR Y-9C. 
Specifically, the asset-size threshold for filing the FR Y-9C was raised from $150 million to 
$500 million. This change in regulation led to a drop of observations in our sample size. Thus, in 
this section we conduct additional robustness tests to rule out the possibility that this drop in 
firm-year observations after 2005 biases our results.  
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In Table 9, column 1, we introduce an indicator variable (Post 2005), which equals one 
for years after 2005, zero otherwise, and we rerun our primary test, Eq.1. In column 2, we limit 
the analysis to observations of banks that are in our sample throughout the whole sample period 
and we re-estimate our main model. Our previously discussed inferences hold under both 
specifications suggesting that the drop in firm year observations post 2005 is not biasing our 
results.  
 




Using branch-level data on public and private U.S. banking institutions, we investigate 
the importance of branch religiosity in shaping bank risk-taking behavior. We argue that branch 
religiosity may affect bank risk-taking because: i) religious customers are per se less risky 
borrowers (demand effect) and ii) decisions taken by banks need to be aligned with the values of 
the geographic area in which the bank operates (supply effect). 
We provide robust evidence that branch religiosity is negatively related to bank risk-
taking. Interestingly, this result holds even after controlling for headquarter religiosity, thus 
indicating that the effect of branch religiosity is additive and not washed out by headquarter 
religiosity. Our findings document that the driver of bank’s behaviors is not fully captured by 
headquarters’ religiosity, as claimed by previous research, but that the religiosity of the 
geographic area in which the bank operates significantly influences bank risk taking.  
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This finding is subject to a number of caveats. First, we are unable to unequivocally 
separate the demand from the supply effect of religiosity on bank risk taking. Second, even 
though in our analysis we control for various demographic factors specific to the geographic area 
of the branches, there may be other factors correlated with branch religiosity that influences bank 
risk taking.  
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Branch Religiosity  Logarithm of REL_BRANCH 
REL_BRANCH  The number of religious adherents in the county (as reported by   
  ARDA) to the total population of the county (as reported by US  
  Census Bureau), weighted by the amount of deposits in the county. 
Headquarter Religiosity  Logarithmic transformation of the number of adherents per 1,000 
population of the county where the bank headquarters is located. 
 
Risk Taking Variables 
LnZscore  Log of (ROA+CAR)/ σ (ROA), where ROA is operating earnings  
                                                    divided by assets, CAR is the capital-asset ratio and σ (ROA) is the 
standard deviation of ROA. We multiply the score by -1, so that higher Z-
score implies more risk taking. 
CO  Total charge-offs divided by gross loans at the end of year t. 
NPL    Total non-performing loans divided by gross loans at the end of  
    year t. 
Failure    Dummy variable equals one if the bank failed during the sample period,  
                                                     zero otherwise 
  Overall Risk                     First factor of a principal component analysis of LnZscore, CO, NPL and 
Failure. 
       
 
Bank-level Control Variables 
Non Interest   Non interest income divided by operating income. 
Tier 1    Tier 1 capital divided by risk-weighted-assets. 
Ln Assets   Logarithm of total assets. 
Assets Growth   Growth in total assets in the year t. 
Revenue Growth  Growth in the net interest revenue in year t. 
Commercial   Commercial and industrial loans as percentage of total loans. 
Individual   Individual loans as percentage of total loans. 
Real Estate   Real Estate loans as percentage of total loans. 
Depository Institution  Loans towards depository institutions as percentage of total loans.  
Too Big                            Dummy variable equals one if the bank accounts for more than 10% of 
the      yearly total deposits of all sample banks, 0 otherwise.  
Bank Market Share          Market shares of the bank in terms of deposits. 
ROA  Operating earnings divided by total assets. 
STD ROA  Standard deviation of ROA. 
 
 
County-level Control Variables 
Diversity   Percentage of minority population in the county. 
Education   Percentage of people 25 years and above who have a bachelor’s,  
    postgraduate or professional degree in the county. 
Economics                      Economics is the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s state- level 
coincident index of economic conditions 
Congregations                 Computed as Branch Religiosity but considering the number of 
congregations instead of the number of adherents. 
Republicans   Percentage of the population in the county who is affiliate with  
    Republican Party. 
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Table 1. Sample Distributions 
      
Year Freq. % 
2000 777 9.92% 
2001 837 10.69% 
2002 881 11.25% 
2003 928 11.85% 
2004 1,021 13.04% 
2005 1,021 13.04% 
2006 486 6.21% 
2007 476 6.08% 
2008 458 5.85% 
2009 467 5.96% 
2010 479 6.12% 
Total 7,831 100% 
      
Unique obs. 1,578   
 




Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Obs Mean Std.Dev. p25 Median p75 
LnZcore 7,831 -3.790 0.694 -4.251 -3.772 -3.306 
CO 7,831 0.005 0.008 0.001 0.003 0.006 
NPL 7,831 0.023 0.022 0.009 0.016 0.028 
Failure 7,831 0.017 0.131 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Overall Risk 7,831 -0.028 0.898 -0.526 -0.254 0.167 
Branch Religiosity 7,831 6.197 0.288 6.095 6.252 6.364 
Headquarter Religiosity 7,831 6.262 0.240 6.131 6.285 6.415 
Non-Interest 7,831 0.228 0.119 0.154 0.208 0.275 
Tier 1 7,831 0.125 0.044 0.099 0.116 0.140 
Ln Assets 7,831 13.586 1.365 12.583 13.287 14.062 
Assets Growth 7,831 0.092 0.127 0.022 0.070 0.131 
Revenue Growth 7,831 0.035 0.140 -0.058 0.034 0.127 
ROA 7,831 0.012 0.011 0.009 0.013 0.017 
Std. ROA 7,831 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.005 
Commercial 7,831 0.164 0.093 0.099 0.149 0.210 
Individual 7,831 0.005 0.016 0.000 0.002 0.005 
Real Estate 7,831 0.700 0.148 0.610 0.715 0.806 
Depository Institutions 7,831 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Too Big 7,831 0.214 0.410 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Bank Share 7,831 0.303 0.568 0.045 0.090 0.211 
Diversity 7,831 39.944 19.911 22.297 39.429 54.103 
Education 7,831 20.126 3.373 17.911 20.476 22.410 
Economics 7,831 139.201 11.654 133.343 137.811 144.892 
Congregations 7,831 1.392 0.817 0.726 1.236 1.878 
Republicans 7,831 49.836 16.126 40.205 51.131 62.120 
 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. Variables are defined in Appendix A. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
 
 
Table 3. Univariate Analysis 
 
    LnZscore CO NPL Failure 
Branch 
Religiosity 
Low 25% -3.789 0.005 0.022 0.024 
Top 25% -3.902 0.004 0.021 0.004 
  Diff. (Top - Low) 0.113 0.001 0.001 0.020 
  P-value (t-test) 0.000 0.042 0.100 0.000 
  P-value (W-M-W test) 0.000 0.055 0.544 0.000 
 
Table 3 reports univariate analysis of the influence of religiosity on risk taking. 
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Table 4. Religiosity and Bank Risk Taking 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  LnZscore CO NPL Failure Overall Risk Overall Risk Overall Risk 
                
Branch Religiosity -0.0725*** -0.0006*** -0.0013** -0.4263*** -0.1408*** -0.1408*** -0.1408** 
  [-2.593] [-3.018] [-2.112] [-2.812] [-4.106] [-8.333] [-2.166] 
Headquarter Religiosity -0.017 0.000 0.000 -0.4644*** -0.0813** -0.0813** -0.0813 
  [-0.576] [-0.070] [-0.014] [-3.690] [-2.359] [-2.750] [-1.209] 
Lag CO   0.5385***           
    [21.588]           
Lag NPL     0.7747***         
      [42.451]         
Non Interest -0.1096 0.0011 -0.0001 -1.0632*** -0.224* -0.2240 -0.2240 
  [-1.569] [1.562] [-0.073] [-2.751] [-1.844] [-1.071] [-1.177] 
Tier 1 -6.2287*** 0.0074*** 0.0048 -10.3615*** -4.6776*** -4.6776*** -4.6776*** 
  [-34.266] [5.095] [1.138] [-6.084] [-18.429] [-4.659] [-12.020] 
Ln Assets 0.1929*** 0.0003** -0.0007** -0.3552*** 0.0131 0.0131 0.0131 
  [12.977] [2.424] [-2.355] [-3.842] [0.720] [0.411] [0.392] 
Assets Growth 0.4411*** -0.0067*** -0.0040* 0.3621 -0.2403** -0.2403 -0.2403** 
  [6.451] [-11.140] [-1.770] [1.027] [-2.333] [-1.272] [-2.571] 
Revenue Growth -0.1625* -0.0001 -0.0057** -0.1646 -1.7563*** -1.7563*** -1.7563*** 
  [-1.703] [-0.117] [-2.014] [-0.351] [-10.714] [-3.484] [-9.826] 
ROA   -0.3030*** -0.4077*** -7.1253       
    [-22.120] [-11.857] [-1.589]       
STD ROA   0.2378*** 0.5722*** 111.0526***       
    [7.792] [7.452] [8.066]       
Commercial 0.8786*** -0.0014 -0.0070*** 0.0839 -0.0238 -0.0238 -0.0238 
  [7.973] [-1.582] [-3.267] [0.107] [-0.167] [-0.166] [-0.091] 
Individual 1.1177** 0.0324*** 0.0154* -1.6807 4.8407*** 4.8407*** 4.8407*** 
  [2.432] [6.355] [1.819] [-0.465] [5.950] [4.668] [3.127] 
        (to be continued on the next page) 
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(continued)               
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  LnZscore CO NPL Failure Overall Risk Overall Risk Overall Risk 
Real Estate 0.9430*** -0.0030*** -0.0013 1.4123*** 0.0979 0.0979 0.0979 
  [12.217] [-4.511] [-0.883] [2.682] [0.967] [0.445] [0.519] 
Depository Institutions -8.6463*** 0.0191 0.0083 29.7452*** 0.6940 0.6940 0.6940 
  [-3.030] [0.964] [0.240] [3.006] [0.212] [0.202] [0.138] 
Too Big 0.0188 0.0006** 0.0015** 0.5800*** 0.1891*** 0.1891*** 0.1891*** 
  [0.740] [2.421] [2.455] [3.763] [4.565] [3.355] [2.892] 
Bank Share -0.2948*** 0.0003 0.0012** 0.5610*** -0.0276 -0.0276 -0.0276 
  [-10.404] [1.337] [2.350] [3.786] [-0.719] [-0.554] [-0.360] 
Diversity 0.0046*** 0.0000*** 0.0000** -0.0006 0.006*** 0.0060*** 0.0060*** 
  [11.824] [3.396] [2.412] [-0.275] [11.929] [5.514] [6.720] 
Education 0.0108*** 0.0001*** 0.0001** 0.0003 0.0077*** 0.0077 0.0077 
  [5.018] [4.825] [1.977] [0.023] [2.898] [1.075] [1.581] 
Economics 0.0015** 0 -0.0000* 0.0132*** -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0014 
  [2.141] [-1.098] [-1.813] [3.353] [-1.463] [-0.674] [-0.823] 
Congregations 0.0223** 0.0004*** 0.0008*** -0.1114 0.0898*** 0.0898*** 0.0898*** 
  [2.029] [3.698] [3.023] [-1.413] [6.193] [9.989] [3.395] 
Republicans -0.0013** 0 0 0.0078*** -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0010 
  [-2.407] [1.488] [-1.457] [2.817] [-1.362] [-0.754] [-0.713] 
Constant -6.3484*** 0.0049** 0.0371*** 5.0928** 1.7807*** 1.7807** 1.7807** 
  [-21.774] [2.182] [5.947] [2.505] [4.729] [2.469] [2.563] 
                
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Bank&Year Bank&Year Bank&Year Bank&Year Bank&Year Year Bank 
Observations 7,831 7,831 7,831 7,831 7,831 7,831 7,831 
R-squared 0.362 0.677 0.689 0.274  0.377 0.377 0.377 
 
Table 4 reports the regression results explaining bank risk taking using Branch Religiosity. All the variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are double-clustered by 
bank and year in Columns (1)-(5), by year in column (6) and by bank in column (7). ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, 
respectively, in a two-tailed test. T-statistics are reported in brackets. 
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Table 5. Religiosity and Bank Risk-Taking in M&A setting 
 
  (1) (2) 
  Change Risk Change Risk 
Diff_Religiosity -0.3055*   
  [-1.957]   
Branch Religiosity Target    -0.4209** 
    [-2.237] 
Total Religiosity Acquirer   0.2766 
    [1.623] 
Non Interest -0.5995 -0.6131 
  [-0.686] [-0.700] 
Tier 1 -3.6303 -3.8050 
  [-1.151] [-1.232] 
Ln Assets 0.5145*** 0.5085 
  [3.122] [3.062] 
Assets Growth -0.1239 -0.1057 
  [-0.268] [-0.223] 
Revenue Growth 0.0604 -0.0535 
  [0.114] [-0.097] 
Commercial -1.4862 -1.4522 
  [-1.452] [-1.436] 
Individual -5.1982 -5.2468 
  [-0.993] [-1.031] 
Real Estate 0.6502 0.6149 
  [0.799] [0.754] 
Depository Institutions 8.7260 7.7909 
  [0.441] [0.388] 
Too Big 0.0044 0.0097 
  [0.017] [0.038] 
Bank Shares -0.7409** -0.7294 
  [-2.177] [-2.157] 
Diversity -0.0029 -0.0020 
  [-0.636] [-0.481] 
Education 0.0162 0.0156 
  [0.646] [0.629] 
Economics 0.0270*** 0.0273 
  [3.639] [3.621] 
Congregations -0.0589 -0.0425 
  [-0.668] [-0.444] 
Republicans -0.0023 -0.0018 
  [-0.449] [-0.365] 
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Constant -11.8909*** -10.8173 
  [-4.718] [-3.598] 
      
Observations 125 125 
R-squared 0.351 0.353 
 
In table 5 we use the M&A deals that occurred during our sample period to tease out branch versus headquarter effect. Change 
Risk is the difference of Overall Risk for the acquirer bank in the three years after the M&A deal and the three years before the 
deal; Branch Religiosity Target measures the branch religiosity (as previously described in the paper) of the target bank, while 
Total Religiosity Acquirer is the sum of the Branch Religiosity and Headquarter Religiosity of the acquirer bank; and 
Diff_Religiosity is the difference between Branch Religiosity Target and Total Religiosity Acquirer. All other variables are 
defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 
percent and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. T-statistics are reported in brackets.  
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Table 6. Protestants 
 
  High Protestant Low Protestant 
  (1) (2) 
  Overall Risk Overall Risk 
Branch Religiosity -0.2833*** -0.0862* 
  [-3.308] [-1.882] 
Headquarter Religiosity 0.0433 -0.1457*** 
  [0.776] [-2.628] 
   
Difference in coef. on 
Branch Religiosity 
p-value (<0.000) 
      
Non-Interest 0.0583 -0.5652*** 
  [0.467] [-4.919] 
Tier 1 -4.2756*** -5.6441*** 
  [-12.966] [-17.943] 
Ln Assets -0.0545** 0.0883*** 
  [-1.998] [3.477] 
Assets Growth -0.2522** -0.1184 
  [-1.992] [-0.914] 
Revenue Growth -1.7407*** -1.8501*** 
  [-11.497] [-11.800] 
Commercial 0.0212 0.0424 
  [0.104] [0.223] 
Individual -1.2243 6.6823*** 
  [-1.250] [8.111] 
Real Estate 0.2620* 0.0603 
  [1.861] [0.425] 
Depository Institutions -7.1239 3.0769 
  [-1.635] [0.743] 
Too Big 0.0846** -0.0592 
  [2.450] [-1.636] 
Bank Shares 0.1687*** -0.0790* 
  [2.992] [-1.648] 
Diversity 0.0054*** 0.0059*** 
  [6.326] [7.710] 
Education 0.0036 0.0126*** 
  [0.757] [2.950] 
Economics -0.0059*** -0.0007 
  [-3.320] [-0.630] 
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(continued)     
Congregations 0.0503** 0.0647** 
  [2.380] [2.021] 
Republican -0.0024** -0.0006 
  [-2.173] [-0.590] 
Constant 3.9322*** 1.5805*** 
  [5.567] [2.982] 
      
Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 3,564 3,564 
R-squared 0.327 0.439 
 
Table 6 reports the regression results explaining the relation between branch religiosity and bank risk-taking using Protestants 
as partitioning variable. Protestants is the bank level measure of bank exposure to Protestant denomination. High Protestant 
(Low Protestant) equals one if the percentage of Protestants is above (below) the median sample, zero otherwise. All other 
variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are double-clustered by bank and year. In the test for differences in 
coefficient standard errors are clustered by year. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 
percent levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. T-statistics are reported in brackets. We also report p-value from Wald tests 
assessing the statistical significance of the differences across select coefficient (two-tailed test). 
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Table 7. Religiosity and Bank Risk Taking around the Financial Crisis 
 
  (1) 
  Overall Risk 
    
Branch Religiosity -0.0723** 
  [-2.433] 
Headquarter Religiosity -0.0323 
  [-0.998] 
CRISIS 3.6211*** 
  [4.211] 
CRISIS*Branch Religiosity -0.2843** 
  [-2.166] 
CRISIS* Headquarter 
Religiosity -0.1928* 
  [-1.655] 
Non Interest -0.2704** 
  [-2.127] 
Tier 1 -4.5463*** 
  [-17.717] 
Ln Assets 0.0513*** 
  [2.870] 
Assets Growth -0.4594*** 
  [-5.146] 
Revenue Growth -1.6529*** 
  [-17.099] 
Commercial 0.0203 
  [0.142] 
Individual 4.9167*** 
  [5.987] 
Real Estate 0.1648* 
  [1.653] 
Depository Institutions -0.5408 
  [-0.158] 
Too Big 0.1907*** 
  [4.453] 
Bank Shares -0.0968** 
  [-2.529] 
Diversity 0.0066*** 
  [12.828] 
Education 0.0093*** 
  [3.441] 
Economics -0.0033*** 
  [-3.318] 






  36 
 
(continued)   
Congregations 0.0996*** 
  [6.797] 
Republicans -0.0010 
  [-1.334] 
Constant 0.2596 
  [0.810] 
    




Table 7 reports the regression results investigating the effect of the financial crisis on the relation between branch religiosity 
and bank risk-taking. CRISIS is a dummy equal 1 for years after 2007, zero otherwise.  All other variables are defined in 
Appendix A. Standard errors are double-clustered by bank and year. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 
percent and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. T-statistics are reported in brackets. 
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Table 8. Measuring Risk Over Time 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Overall Risk (t+1) Overall Risk (t+2) Overall Risk (t+3) 
        
Branch Religiosity -0.1482*** -0.1627*** -0.1454*** 
  [-3.691] [-3.481] [-2.729] 
Headquarter Religiosity -0.0933** -0.0783* -0.0911* 
  [-2.373] [-1.756] [-1.804] 
Non-Interest -0.4953*** -0.7702*** -0.6818*** 
  [-3.844] [-5.971] [-4.534] 
Tier 1 -4.0167*** -3.3772*** -2.7029*** 
  [-16.378] [-13.791] [-9.447] 
Ln Assets 0.0493** 0.0812*** 0.0626** 
  [2.389] [3.471] [2.345] 
Assets Growth -0.0337 0.2133* 0.3312** 
  [-0.286] [1.654] [2.289] 
Revenue Growth -0.9510*** -0.2438 0.4403** 
  [-5.521] [-1.533] [2.475] 
Commercial 0.0414 0.1721 0.1702 
  [0.261] [0.969] [0.878] 
Individual 4.7473*** 5.3700*** 4.9236*** 
  [5.591] [5.723] [5.276] 
Real Estate 0.1474 0.3093** 0.5043*** 
  [1.302] [2.439] [3.594] 
Depository Institutions -0.4710 -0.3886 2.2096 
  [-0.138] [-0.099] [0.508] 
Too Big 0.1486*** 0.0586 0.0587 
  [3.073] [1.115] [0.981] 
Bank Shares -0.0443 -0.0253 0.0296 
  [-1.013] [-0.519] [0.542] 
Diversity 0.0050*** 0.0047*** 0.0045*** 
  [8.490] [7.102] [6.158] 
Education 0.0111*** 0.0120*** 0.0150*** 
  [3.578] [3.331] [3.549] 
Economics -0.0006 0.0018 0.0026 
  [-0.530] [1.161] [1.435] 
Congregations 0.0988*** 0.1181*** 0.1211*** 
  [5.832] [6.042] [5.584] 
Republicans -0.0016* -0.0024** -0.0032*** 
  [-1.956] [-2.428] [-2.884] 
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Constant 1.8548*** 1.0591** -0.4642 
  [4.262] [2.135] [-0.849] 
        
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,609 5,426 4,444 
R-squared 0.333 0.340 0.358 
 
Table 8 reports the regression results explaining bank future risk taking using Branch Religiosity. All the variables are defined 
in Appendix A. Standard errors are double-clustered by bank and year. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 
5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. T-statistics are reported in brackets. 
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Table 9. Controlling for dropping in sample size after 2005 
 
  (1) (2) 
  Overall Risk Overall Risk 
      
Branch Religiosity -0.1408*** -0.1122** 
  [-4.106] [-2.094] 
Headquarter Religiosity -0.0813** -0.0469 
  [-2.359] [-1.054] 
Post 2005 0.3530***   
  [6.475]   
Non Interest -0.2240* -0.4040*** 
  [-1.844] [-2.708] 
Tier 1 -4.6776*** -5.3235*** 
  [-18.429] [-14.113] 
Ln Assets 0.0131 -0.0542** 
  [0.720] [-2.246] 
Assets Growth -0.2403** -0.1066 
  [-2.333] [-0.861] 
Revenue Growth -1.7563*** -1.9943*** 
  [-10.714] [-9.422] 
Commercial -0.0238 0.5181*** 
  [-0.167] [2.958] 
Individual 4.8407*** 6.1734*** 
  [5.950] [6.956] 
Real Estate 0.0979 0.7266*** 
  [0.967] [6.181] 
Depository Institutions 0.6940 6.9930* 
  [0.212] [1.884] 
Too Big 0.1891*** 0.2015*** 
  [4.565] [4.649] 
Bank Shares -0.0276 0.0793* 
  [-0.719] [1.908] 
Diversity 0.0060*** 0.0066*** 
  [11.929] [9.222] 
Education 0.0077*** 0.0124*** 
  [2.898] [3.400] 
Economics -0.0014 -0.0028** 
  [-1.463] [-2.308] 
Congregations 0.0898*** 0.0998*** 
  [6.193] [4.810] 
  (to be continued on the next page) 
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(continued)     
Republicans -0.0010 -0.0037*** 
  [-1.362] [-3.874] 
Constant 1.4278*** 1.7069*** 
  [3.949] [3.430] 
      
Year FE Yes Yes 
Observations 7,831 4,880 
R-squared 0.377 0.412 
 
Table 9 reports the regression results explaining bank risk taking using Branch Religiosity while controlling for the drop in 
observations after 2005. Models (1) we report results for the overall sample, while in Model (2) we restrict our analysis to those 
observations that are in our sample before and after the change in requirements.  Post_2005 is a dummy variable equals to one for 
fiscal years after 2005, zero otherwise. All the variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are double-clustered by bank 
and year. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
T-statistics are reported in brackets. 
 
 
